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FISHING, FOWLING, AND DOCKOMINIUMS:
MAINE’S NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INTERTIDAL RIGHTS
Agnieszka A. Pinette*
“The use of sea and air is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean belong
to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and
custom permit any possession therof.”
- Elizabeth I Tudor, Letters (1533-1603)1

I. INTRODUCTION
In the sixteenth century, Queen Elizabeth recognized the public’s inalienable
right to the sea. Despite the intuitive concept embodied in the Queen’s
pronouncement, a centuries-old debate over the public’s right to the seashore
continues to occupy the attention of Maine’s bar and bench. In 2011, for example,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, handed down a
decision that maintains Maine’s prevailing judicial analytical framework for
resolving property disputes in the intertidal zone.2 In McGarvey v. Whittredge,3 the
plaintiffs, claiming ownership of the intertidal zone, brought an action in trespass
and sought a declaratory judgment that the neighboring commercial scuba diving
business operators and their customers had no right to cross the intertidal zone to
access the ocean to scuba dive.4 The court’s unanimous judgment resolved the
property interest at issue by holding that, as a matter of Maine common law, the
public has a right to walk across the intertidal zone to access the ocean for purposes
of scuba diving.5
By confining its holding to a precise activity—traversing the intertidal zone to
reach the ocean in order to scuba dive—the court was able to reach a unanimous
judgment; however, the justices arrived at this common result through two evenly
divided analyses supported by fundamentally different doctrinal approaches.
Specifically, the analyses relied on disparate interpretations of the public trust
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Maine School of Law. Many thanks to Professors Laura S.
Underkuffler and Gerald F. Petruccelli for their valuable insights.
1. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 410 (Ronald F. Roxburgh, ed., 3d ed,
2008) (citing ELIZABETH I TUDOR (1533-1603), LETTERS).
2. The intertidal zone generally refers to the stretch of land between the ocean and the dry upland,
which comprises much of Maine’s coastline. More specifically, it is the land located between the mean
high-water and mean low-water marks of tidal waters, but extending seaward no more than 100 rods
from the high-water mark. See Britton v. Donnell, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 6, 12 A.3d 39, 42.
3. 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620 (discussed in Part III.A).
4. Id. ¶ 1.
5. Id. As discussed further in Part II, there has been significant and ongoing debate in Maine as to
whether the public trust rights with respect to the intertidal zone ought to be construed according to the
Law Court’s pronouncements, which essentially confer fee ownership to the intertidal zone to the
upland landowner and bestow to the public a limited right of use and access. Nonetheless, for purposes
of this Comment, the author assumes that the challenge to the fee ownership of the intertidal zone is
settled according to the Law Court’s declarations.
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doctrine and a seventeenth century colonial grant to espouse what I refer to here as
either a “fundamentally purpose-driven” or an “elastic, activities-based” doctrinal
approach. Not surprisingly, the public trust doctrine and the historical grant are
either silent or at best vague with respect to the proper designation of water-related
property rights among public and private entities, and even less clear about how to
address new and evolving uses of Maine’s water resources—many of which were
not imaginable when these principles were established. The fact that there is much
disagreement both within and outside of Maine’s courtrooms regarding how they
ought to be interpreted is therefore not remarkable. It is noteworthy, however, that
the modern judicial approach to resolving water use conflicts in light of this
disagreement seems to favor the judicial principle of narrow construction, as
opposed to the “Grand Style” of appellate decisionmaking.6 While such an
approach to judicially resolving conflict is often in the nature of the common law
tradition, it has not advanced a useful framework for the allocation of property
rights and interests in Maine’s intertidal zone.
The Law Court’s practice of resolving intertidal rights conflicts in Maine on a
case-by-case and use-by-use basis is complemented by a similarly disordered
overlay of federal, state, and municipal laws and rules applicable to emerging water
uses. Each of these levels of government is charged with safeguarding public
interests, including public trust rights with respect to the intertidal zone.
Accordingly, the administrative overlay is afflicted with problems typically
associated with jurisdictional overlap—namely, the risks that regulatory decisions
by three independent administrative levels of government will be made
inefficiently, inconsistently, or both. The more pressing problem with Maine’s
regulation of emerging water uses, however, is not the lack of uniformity, but the
irregular consideration of the public interest. This regulatory gap, which is created
by both statutory restrictions and legal limitations of administrative agencies
undertaking property rights assessments, means that there is presently no assurance
that regulators at any level of government will evaluate emerging water uses with
an eye toward their potential deleterious effects on the public trust.
Maine’s current judicial and administrative approaches to resolving water use
conflicts are not without consequence. They leave the bench, the bar, the
landowner, and the public without a stable property rights framework upon which
to rely to resolve future water use and access conflicts in the intertidal zone.
Furthermore, these approaches tend to engender the incremental privatization of the
public’s property interest in Maine’s water resources. In a state where water access
is the backbone of a dominant tourism industry, such privatization is, to say the
least, a vulnerability. To contextualize these consequences, Part II presents an
overview of Maine’s cyclical demand for water access, and how the dockominium7
6. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960). Llewellyn is
credited for the term “Grand Style.” See Thomas W. Mayo, Charles D. Breitel—Judging in the Grand
Style, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 5, 5-12 (1978) (discussing the foundations and principles of Llewellyn’s
central thesis).
7. The dockominium is a relatively modern real estate instrument modeled on the land-based
condominium through which a boat owner may acquire a fee interest to a boat slip and attendant dock
space. Gurdon H. Buck, Drafting Documentation for Dockominiums, 18-JUN PROB. & PROP. 38, 38
(2004).
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offers an innovative market solution to Maine’s water access problems and at the
same time raises serious questions about the long-term privatization of Maine’s
seashore. Part III then explores the relevant history and evolution of Maine’s
judicial framework of riparian and littoral8 property rights and interests, identifies
the doctrinal inconsistencies with the Law Court’s modern approach to resolving
intertidal rights conflicts, and flags two underlying policies motivating the court’s
modern approach. Part IV highlights how the court’s doctrinal inconsistencies
augment the regulatory discord at the administrative levels of government. Finally,
Part V summarizes the legal uncertainty facing public and private entities who wish
to make novel use of Maine’s intertidal zone, calls on the Law Court to adopt a
unified voice regarding the scope of the public trust, and recommends a factorsbased approach to resolving public and private intertidal rights conflicts—one that
honors both of the policies underlying the court’s divergent doctrinal approaches in
McGarvey.
II. MAINE’S DEMAND FOR WATER ACCESS,
AND THE DOCKOMINIUM SUPPLY-SIDE SOLUTION
Maine is a water-rich state. Within its confines are roughly 5,000 miles of
coastline, and nearly 1,500 square miles of inland waters that include 5,800 lakes
and ponds and 32,000 miles of rivers and streams.9 These abundant waters,
intermingled with Maine’s attractive landscape and highly valued natural resources,
are the backbone of the state’s tourism industry.10 It should come as no surprise,
then, that Maine is an outdoor recreation haven not only for its own residents,11 but
also for the Northeast region of the United States and beyond.12 Maine’s
concentration of housing units that are for seasonal, recreational, or occasional

8. Littoral refers to the shore of a lake or ocean, whereas riparian refers to the bank of a river or
stream. JONATHAN S. LYNTON, BALLENTINE’S LEGAL DICTIONARY & THESAURUS 386 & 590 (1995).
9. Maine State Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan 2009-2014, MAINE DEPT. OF
CONSERVATION, BUREAU OF PARKS AND LANDS IV-1 (Dec. 2009),
http://www.maine.gov/doc/parks/programs/SCORP/index.html [hereinafter SCORP]. The SCORP
analyzes the demand for and supply of outdoor recreation areas and facilities. It highlights the outdoor
recreation issues of statewide importance, based on public and focus group comments, and presents
broad priorities for expenditure of federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF) dollars in
Maine. Id.
10. Tourism, Maine’s largest industry, “produc[es] $10.1 billion in goods and services, $425 million
in tax revenue, and 140,000 jobs.” Id. at III-3.
11. Maine residents participate in outdoor recreation at levels above regional and national averages.
Maine participation rates are especially high in nature-based activities; for example, activities in which
Mainers participate at least 10% above both regional and national levels include “boating (any)” and
“motorboating.” Id. at III-7.
12. “In 2008, there were 15.4 million overnight visitors and 16.5 million day visitors in Maine,”
with nonresidents comprising over 90% overnight visits and 53% of day visits. Id. at III-4. Moreover,
Maine has a relatively high proportion of nonresident participation in recreation activities. For example,
Maine’s state parks report approximately 40% nonresident camper registrations. Id. at III-1. In fact,
“natural attractions are a significant calling card drawing visitors—visitors who after coming to Maine,
value what they experience.” Id. at III-5.
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use—the highest rate of second-home ownership in the nation13—is just one of
many indicators of the state’s appeal as a vacation destination.
Just as the interplay of attractive rural landscapes and access to amenities and
services has driven the demand for second homes,14 so the allure of Maine’s water
resources and attendant infrastructure has supported a steady stream of recreational
boaters. Nearly 57% of Maine residents—roughly 612,000 people—participate in
some type of boating activity each year.15 These boaters have traditionally gained
access to Maine’s waters by using public boating facilities, privately owned noncommercial boat launches, or commercial marinas.16 Notwithstanding the
abundance of natural waters in Maine, it is the presence or absence of accessible
recreational infrastructure—in the form of boat launches, boat slips, parking areas,
signage, fuel stations, and maintenance services—that enables recreational boating
on some waters and impedes it elsewhere.
Presumably in recognition of a need to secure access to Maine’s waters for
public recreational boating, the Maine Legislature established the Boating Facilities
Fund in 1963 and assigned administration of the fund to Boating Facilities Division
of Maine’s Bureau of Parks and Lands in 1997.17 The fund assists local
governments and other entities in acquiring, enhancing, and restoring boat
launching facilities that are open to the public.18 Although these and other
legislative and non-governmental efforts have helped to secure public boating
access to many waters throughout the state, demand for more access remains, even
in light of recent economic slow-down.19
The demand for access to Maine’s waters is consistent with national trends.
The $6.5 billion boating industry in the United States is predicted to grow at a rate

13. Id. at II-6. “Maine’s attractive landscapes and recreational amenities, along with its proximity
to large population centers in the Northeast contribute to high percentages of seasonal homes.” Id.
14. Id. at IV-6.
15. Id. at III-8 tbl.7.
16. Maine supports 459 public boat launches, of which ninety-two are hand-carry sites and
seventeen are tidal water sites, which are owned and maintained by state governmental agencies or
municipal governments. Id. at IV-16 tbl.11.
17. 38 M.R.S.A. § 322 (1965), repealed by P.L. 1997, ch. 678, § 13 (effective June 30, 1998). In
1997, as part of the consolidation of the Bureau of Parks and Recreation with the Bureau of Public
Lands (which formed the Bureau of Parks and Lands), the provisions of the law that established the fund
were moved from Title 38 to Title 12. See 12 M.R.S.A. § 1896 (2005) (pursuant to P.L. 1997, ch. 678,
§ 13). While there is no legislative history on point, it stands to reason that the need to secure public
boating access prompted the Legislature to establish the Fund.
18. SCORP, supra note 9, Introduction at 6. “Sites on both tidal and non-tidal waters are eligible.
Funding is available to assist in the development of hand-carry as well as trailered boat launching
facilities. However, since the Fund derives its revenue from a portion of the gasoline taxes generated by
recreational motor boaters, priority is given to funding launching facilities that can be used by both
motor and non-motorized watercraft.” Id. From 2003 to 2008, the Bureau acquired thirty new boating
facilities and carried out forty facilities improvement projects. Id. at I-2.
19. For example, while the recession appears to have slowed demand for coastal water access in
recent years, economist Charles Colgan predicts that, “[n]ew demands on the waterfront are emerging.
The coast will be more crowded than ever.” Janet Krenn, Working Waterfronts and Waterways, 43 VA.
MARINE RESOURCE BULL., Winter 2011, at 8-9, available at http://vaseagrant.vims.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/VMRBWinter11_web.pdf.
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of approximately 8% through 2014.20 At the same time, increasing land values for
waterfront property during the most recent real estate boom induced the conversion
of marinas with public boat slips to more lucrative residential development, leading
to an access crisis for recreational boaters in some parts of the country.21 Congress
has attempted to respond to the problem on several occasions with bills such as the
2009 and 2011 Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act.22 The bills aimed to
preserve and expand access to coastal waters for water-dependent commercial uses
through a state-administered grant program.23 While these bills were ultimately
defeated in committee,24 they are an indicator of the political challenges of
preserving public access to the water as coastal property increases in value.
Access problems for recreational boaters are not recent phenomena; rather,
they are closely tied to the nation’s economic cycles. In the booming 1980s, for
example, demand for docking and mooring space far outstripped supply, thereby
elevating premiums for slip rental rights and propelling the boating industry on a
“bubble of frantic searches for places to moor pleasure boats.”25 The early 1990s
were marked by falling boat slip prices, consistent with the decade’s real estate
bust.26 As beneficiaries of the expanding economy began to purchase boats again
in the early 2000s, boat slip prices rose accordingly.27
It is likely that demand for recreational boat slips will again outstrip supply
with the next economic upswing. After all, whenever the natural human inclination
to live near and play in the water28 becomes viable—as tends to happen with the
availability of discretionary income during times of economic expansion—it
encounters the natural, regulatory, and market limitations on expanding boating
20. Freedonia Group, Recreational Boating to 2014—Market Research, Market Share, Market Size,
Sales, Demand Forecast, Market Leaders, Company Profiles, Industry Trends,
http://www.freedoniagroup.com/Recreational-Boating.html (June 2012).
21. See Ryck Lydecker, Boaters Get Bumped By Hot Real Estate Market, BOATUS (Mar. 2006),
http://www.boatus.com/gov/fed/fed_archives/waterfront_article606.asp.
22. Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2009, H.R. 2548, 111th Cong. (2009); Keep
America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2011, H.R. 3109, 112th Cong. (2011).
23. Id.
24. Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US (last visited Oct. 20, 2012),
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2548; Keep America’s Waterfronts Working Act of 2011,
GOVTRACK.US (last visited Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3109.
25. Buck, supra note 7, at 38.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 38-39.
28. See, e.g., Mike Richards, Water in History, H2O—THE MYSTERY, ART, AND SCIENCE OF
WATER, http://witcombe.sbc.edu/ water/history.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
Humans have generally settled near convenient sources of water. Most of the great ancient civilizations
depended on a particular source of water . . . . Water facilitated relatively rapid transportation prior to
about 1850 C.E. In the era of exploration and discovery from the late 15th through the 18th centuries,
Europeans explored all the major oceans and seas. Water was also thought to be an essential aspect of
imperialism from the 16th century on . . . . Water was also an important source of power in the period
before the Industrial Revolution . . . . Beginning with the Industrial Revolution, however, water
increasingly becomes a hidden factor in human history. For many, it quite literally went underground,
hidden from sight until one turned on a faucet or flushed a toilet. Increasing [sic], there was a tendency
to view it as something to master and control. This is, of course, in accord with a more general
approach to nature as a whole: mastery and control.
Id.
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infrastructure. These limitations include natural resource controls, such as physical
and geographic features of the water resource and its adjoining shoreland that
restrict the placement of the boat ramps, boat slips, and associated infrastructure;
regulatory limits imposed through a range of local and federal permitting
requirements; and market-based pressures to allocate access infrastructure to
highest-and-best uses (which, as discussed, often means converting commercial
marinas to other uses). Accordingly, this type of unmet demand for water access is
likely to place increased pressures on the market, in the form of higher prices for
securing water access and attendant infrastructure; on natural resources, in the form
of increased use of shores and waters; and on regulatory regimes, in the form of
additional administrative and judicial actions spurred by increased permit requests
and frequent water use conflicts.
A. The Dockominium “Solution” to the Recreational Boating Access Problem
A relatively recent market response and an innovative legal solution to this
cyclical access demand is the dockominium. A dockominium is functionally a
collection of boat slips, which is legally premised on a condominium ownership
theory: Persons may purchase an ownership interest in a dockominium in order to
gain both the exclusive right to use a boat slip space (and presumably to exclude
others from it) and a fractional interest in any association common areas, such as
parking lots and off-season boat storage space.29
A dockominium usually comes into being with the transformation of an
established commercial marina offering short-term rental or day use boat slips to
the public.30 Where states have adopted a version of the Uniform Common Interest
Ownership Act (UCIOA), as Maine has done,31 “any estate or interest in, over, or
under land . . . [including] spaces that may be filled with air or water” is deemed
real estate that may be developed into a common interest community, which is then
divided into units and conveyed just like any interest in land.32 The “units” are
essentially segments of riparian or littoral rights, consisting of the right to tie up a
vessel to a dock within a measured and specific location.33 The location, with
respect to the lateral configuration, is a two-dimensional space on the water’s
surface that usually corresponds to some percentage of a floating dock or finger
pier.34 With respect to the vertical configuration, upper and lower boundaries are
29. See Karin J. Wagner, Note, Geneva Lake Dockominiums: An Exercise of Riparian Rights in
Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine, 4 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 243, 244 (1997) (citing Catherine Robinson
Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 331, 331-50
(1990)).
30. Sarah Williams, Riparian Landowners Versus the Public: The Importance of Roads and
Highways for Public Access to Wisconsin's Navigable Waters, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 185, 215-16.
31. 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1601 to 1604-118 (1999 & Supp. 2011) (Maine Condominium Act).
32. Buck, supra note 7, at 39 (internal quotations omitted). The Maine Condominium Act defines
real estate as “any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over or under land . . . [including] parcels with
or without upper or lower boundaries and spaces that may be filled with air or water . . . .” 33 M.R.S.A.
§ 1601-103(21). As part of the declaration, declarants must record a plat or plan bearing the seal and
signature of the preparer, and must show the locations and dimensions of the vertical boundaries of each
unit, as well as any horizontal unit boundaries. Id. § 1602-109(a), (d).
33. Buck, supra note 7, at 42.
34. Id.
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usually not specified or, if they are, run “vertically from the center of the earth to
the heavens.”35
Because the UCIOA adopts such a broad definition of the type of real estate
that may be developed into common interest communities—and because the Maine
Condominium Act bars the enactment of zoning, ordinances, or other regulations
that prohibit the condominium form of ownership36—riparian and littoral rights can
be severed from shoreland property and transferred separately from any land
ownership interest.37 As a result, the dockominium, as a real estate instrument,
effectively serves at least three market purposes: First, it affords recreational
boaters a secure tenure—namely, the exclusive right to occupy a three-dimensional
space on, under, and above the water surface—during times of increasing demand
for water access. Second, it offers commercial marinas the opportunity to
maximize profit by severing and selling off some or all of the boat slip inventory or
by entirely privatizing the facility and eliminating all resource-intensive shore-side
boating services.38 Third, it can serve as an attractive investment opportunity
during times of economic expansion.39
B. Every Solution is a Problem: The Dockominium “Solution”
in Light of the Public’s Intertidal Rights
Although the dockominium can serve as a market-based tool to ease the unmet
demand for recreational water access, it is not without its own set of problems. As a
real estate instrument, the dockominium raises questions concerning the scope of
water-based property interests of public and private entities. This is because the
dockominium literally bridges the gap between the upland and the water.
Notwithstanding the numerous ways of installing a dockominium and its attendant
infrastructure (e.g., dredging, filling, or simply wharfing out), some portion of the
dockominium will therefore either occupy or alter the intertidal zone—or both.
And, consequently, that portion will exclude the public from the three-dimensional
space which it occupies.40 This begs the question: Do dockominiums, because
they functionally privatize access to and use of the horizontal and vertical space
affected by the facilities, come into conflict with any of the public’s reserved rights
under the public trust doctrine?
Several commentators have explored the potential property rights conflicts
presented by dockominiums.41 In general, legal scholars contend that these types

35. Id.
36. 33 M.R.S.A. § 1601-106. Notably, the Act also prohibits governmental entities from enforcing
any regulations or policies that are in conflict with its provisions. Id.
37. See Wagner, supra note 29, at 245; Dunton v. Parker, 97 Me. 461, 467, 54 A. 1115, 1118 (1903)
(ownership of intertidal zone may be separated by deed from ownership of adjacent upland).
38. Mark Cheung, Dockominiums: An Expansion of Riparian Rights that Violates the Public Trust
Doctrine, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 821, 822-23 (1989).
39. See Buck, supra note 7, at 38-39 (citing reports to high and rising prices for boat slip
dockominiums during troubled national economic climates).
40. A dockominium is also likely to spur water use and access conflicts between dockominium
“residents” and other boaters and users of the intertidal zone, and thereby may functionally exclude the
public from some unfixed area beyond the footprint taken up by its physical infrastructure.
41. See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 38; Hall, supra note 29; Wagner, supra note 29.
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of facilities do threaten the public’s right of access to state waters under the public
trust doctrine because such a legal construct grants private entities an exclusive
property interest in the affected water.42 Courts, however, have been largely silent
on the issue. Only the Wisconsin courts have held that the conversion of a marina
to a dockominium may violate that state’s public trust doctrine, notwithstanding
riparian owners’ established rights to reasonable use of state waters.43
Dockominium developments nonetheless remain quite popular on the east coast.44
That different jurisdictions might adopt different approaches regarding the
legitimacy of dockominiums in this respect should come as no surprise, given the
Supreme Court’s long-standing instruction that the public trust doctrine should be
enforced by each state “according to its own views of justice and policy.”45
Consequently, to fully appreciate the property rights issues presented by
dockominiums in Maine, the underpinnings of Maine’s public trust doctrine and
other established water rights doctrines—as well as relevant statutory and
regulatory frameworks—form necessary context. This context is the subject of
Parts III and IV, infra.
III. MAINE’S JUDICIAL FRAMEWORK OF RIPARIAN AND LITTORAL RIGHTS
A. Colonial Roots
Maine common law recognizes three categories of waters that are subject to
some form of public servitude: great ponds, tidal waters, and nontidal navigable
rivers or streams.46 Each of these categories is defined quite differently. Great
42. See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 38; Hall, supra note 29; Wagner, supra note 29. Relatedly,
scholars seem to agree that dockominiums do not conflict with the riparian rights doctrine. Id. Thus,
the owner of shoreland adjoining a lake or river is free to transfer his littoral or riparian rights to one or
more entities without any legal ties to the adjoining land, despite the fact that the land vested in him
solely because of his original title to the shoreland.
43. See, e.g., ABKA P’ship v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 2001 WI App 223, ¶¶ 1-4, 247 Wis.2d
793, 802-03, 635 N.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) , aff’d on other grounds, 2002 WI 106, 255
Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 2002). In 1994, ABKA sought administrative approval for the
conversion of a 407-unit rented boat slip marina on Lake Geneva into dockominiums; however, the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources asserted that ABKA was legally required to withhold some
of the slips from sale for rent by the public. Id. ¶ 1, 247 Wis. 2d at 802-03, 635 N.W.2d at 171-72. The
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld the administrative decision, stating that the dockominium
development violated the public trust doctrine and was not a reasonable riparian use of state waters. Id.
¶ 4, 247 Wis. 2d at 803, 635 N.W.2d at 172. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also held that the
conversion violated the public trust doctrine, but based its decision on Wisconsin statutory law rather
than on common law. ABKA P’ship, 2002 WI 106 at ¶ 2, 255 Wis. 2d at 493-94, 648 N.W.2d at 857.
See also Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View Into the
Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123 (2012) (discussing Wisconsin’s legal framework for protecting
public water rights, and the state’s successes and failures in administering the public trust doctrine);
Sarah Williams, Comment, Riparian Landowners Versus the Public: The Importance of Roads and
Highways for Public Access to Wisconsin's Navigable Waters, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 185, 216-17 (2010).
44. Williams, supra note 43, at 216.
45. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
46. See Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Principles of Ownership Along Water
Bodies, 47 ME. L. REV. 35, 39 (1995). Hermansen & Richards also identify nonnavigable streams as a
category of water bodies recognized by Maine common law. Id. This water category, however, is
beyond the scope of this Comment because Maine common law does not recognize the imposition of a
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ponds are identified by their physical characteristics: they are bodies of standing
water with a surface area of ten acres or more.47 The definition of tidal waters is
tethered to the influence of the tides; thus, tidal waters include not only ocean
waters, but also rivers affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, irrespective of the
fresh or brackish quality of the water.48 By contrast, nontidal navigable rivers and
streams are defined based on their function as flowing waters capable of being used
at least part of the year “for the purposes of commerce, for the floating of vessels,
boats, rafts or logs,”49 and for reasonable public transportation or commercial use.50
Despite their disparate contexts, these definitions—and their attendant public
servitudes—share roots in the English common law tradition. Hale’s treatise, De
Jure Maris,51 was particularly influential in the development of common law in the
United States with regard to riparian and littoral title.52 In essence, Hale
characterized the beds of all freshwater rivers and streams as private property, but
emphasized a sovereign interest in “common passage”; thus, the King had a duty to
protect, for the public’s safety and convenience, those streams and rivers which
were navigable by large or small vessels.53 Moreover, Hale regarded both tidal
waters and intertidal lands as belonging, prima facie, to the sovereign.54
Hale’s private property right and public use characterizations have been quoted
in Maine case law contending with water rights from as early as 182555 and
public servitude on nonnavigable streams. See Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264, 297 (1863) (“The
general doctrine . . . in reference to the use of navigable rivers, or public streams, as public highways, is,
that each person has an equal right to their reasonable use.”).
47. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950).
48. See Lapish v. President of the Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831) (holding that riparian owners’
rights extended to the edge of a stream “at all hours of the tide in its ebbing and flowing; or, in other
words, as far as low water mark”); Stone v. City of Augusta, 46 Me. 127, 137 (1858) (holding that the
an interest in land bounded by the “bank” of a tidal brook only extended to the high tide mark, but
noting that in some cases a boundary that is a river itself could include the low tide mark). “Stone
makes clear that the intent of the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance is directed at the ebbing and
flowing of the tide and not at whether the nature of the water is fresh, brackish, or salty.” Hermansen &
Richards, supra note 46, at 39 n.12.
49. Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 20-22 (1849) (holding that “streams or rivers as are not
floatable, that cannot, in their natural state, be used for the carriage of boats, rafts, or other property, are
wholly and absolutely private; not subject to the servitude of the public interest, nor to be regarded as
public highways, by water, because they are not susceptible of use, as a common passage for the
public.”); see also Hermansen & Richards, supra note 46, at 41-42.
50. See Brown, 31 Me. at 22-23.
51. MATTHEW HALE, DE JURE MARIS, reprinted in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE
FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO AND HALL’S ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN IN
THE SEA-SHORE 370-413 (3d ed. 1888) [hereinafter DE JURE MARIS].
52. See, e.g., Robert W. Malmsheimer & Donald W. Floyd, Fishing Rights in Nontidal, Navigable
New York State Rivers: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 147, 157-58 &
n.84 (1998).
53. DE JURE MARIS, supra note 51, at 372; see also Commonwealth v. Chapin, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.)
199, 201-02 (1827).
54. DE JURE MARIS, supra note 51, at 376, 378 (characterizing a sovereign proprietary right to the
branches of the sea which lie within the fauces terrae, including the shore, which is “that ground that is
between the ordinary high-water and low-water mark”).
55. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 181 (Me. 1989); State v. Leavitt, 105 Me. 76, 72
A. 875, 876 (1909); Veazie v. Dwinel, 50 Me. 479, 489-90 (1862); State v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 43
Me. 198, 201-02 (1857); Treat v. Lord, 42 Me. 552, 561-62 (1856); Pike v. Munroe, 36 Me. 309, 313
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including, most recently, by the Law Court in McGarvey v. Whittredge.56
Moreover, definitions paralleling Hale’s characterizations are codified in several
Maine statutory provisions.57 In short, both Maine’s common law and the state’s
statutory framework of water rights are grounded in large part on Hale’s doctrine.
Thus, in Maine, the beds of tidal waters (so-called submerged lands) are owned by
the state, the beds of nontidal waters are privately owned by the upland owners, and
private ownership beneath navigable waters is subject to the public’s use of the
water as a public highway.58
Two exceptions to this grounding in Hale’s doctrine, however, are Maine’s
property rights treatment of great ponds and of intertidal lands. Maine common
law, unlike that of most states, has been heavily influenced by the Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance of 1641,59 which reads in part:
Everie Inhabitant who is an hous-holder shall have free fishing and fowling, in any
great Ponds, Bayes, Coves and Rivers so far as the Sea ebs and flows, within the
precincts of the town where they dwell, unles the Free-men of the same town, or
the General Court have otherwise appropriated them . . . [I]t is declared that in all
creeks, coves and other places, about and upon salt water where the Sea ebs and
flows, the Proprietor of the land adjoining shall have proprietie to the low water
mark where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever
it ebs farther. Provided that such proprietor shall not by this libertie have power
to stop or hinder the passage of boats or other vessels in, or through any sea
creeks, or coves to other mens houses or lands.60

Notably, the Ordinance was amended in 1647 to forbid towns to appropriate
“to any particular person or persons any great pond containing more than ten acres
of land” and to grant a common right of pedestrian access across privately owned
land to reach any such great pond.61 The Ordinance’s recognition of a public right
(1853); Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 343, 357 (1850); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 14 (1849); Littlefield
v. Littlefield, 28 Me. 180, 184 (1848); Deering v. Proprietors of Long Wharf, 25 Me. 51, 55 (1845);
Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278, 282 (1834); Spring v. Russell, 7 Me. 273, 290 (1831); Berry v. Carle,
3 Me. 269, 273 (1825).
56. 2011 ME 97, ¶ 36, 28 A.3d 620.
57. See, e.g., 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 1862 & 1865 (2005 & Supp. 2011) (addressing right of the State to
lease submerged and intertidal lands owned by the State, contingent upon consideration of the public
trust); 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 436-A(7) & 480-B(5) (2001 & Supp. 2011) (a “great pond” is any inland body of
water which has a surface area in excess of ten acres); 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571-73 (2005) (codifying the
public trust in the Submerged & Intertidal Lands Act, discussed further at Part II.B).
58. See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61-62
(citing to Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph’s Coll., 233 A.2d 718, 721-22 (Me. 1967); In re Opinions of
the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 567, 106 A. 865, 868 (1919); Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849)).
59. See Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be Eroded with Time?, 57 ME. L. REV.
117, 119-20 (2005).
60. BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE
MASSACHUSETS (Thomas G. Barnes, ed., 1975) (emphasis added).
61. Specifically, the Ordinance was amended to read: “And for great ponds lying in Common,
through within the bounds of some Town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowle there, and may
pass and repass on foot through any man’s propriety for that end, so they trespass not upon any man’s
Corn or Meadow.” THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 91 (William H. Whitmore, ed., 1887),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=VznoEGGVcoC&ots=OC_uZHJ0ei#v=onepage&q&f=false.
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to access great ponds was a “radical departure from the principles of law
recognized by . . . the common law of England,”62 which had long recognized a
private property right in all ponds and no reserved jus publicum.63
As more fully explained in Part III.B, the Law Court has repeatedly stated that
the Colonial Ordinance was incorporated into Maine common law as a matter of
custom and usage.64 Consequently, the court has held that the Maine common law,
interpreted according to the terms of the Ordinance’s grant, vests in the public a
right to cross privately owned woodland to access great ponds.65 Similarly, the
court has invoked this same principle as the foundational control on the public’s
rights to the intertidal zone: Applying the Ordinance-grounded common law to
water law controversies, the court has consistently declared that private landowners
hold fee title to the lands between the high-water and low-water marks, extending
no more than 100 rods from the high-water mark,66 and the court has unwaveringly
held that this private ownership is subject to the public’s right to use the intertidal
zone.67
B. Judicial Interpretation of Colonial Roots
to Resolve Modern Water Use Conflicts
The Supreme Court’s line of cases in the 1800s established that the states (1)
acquired title to the beds and banks of navigable waters at the time of statehood, (2)
have broad authority to redefine any such acquired property rights,68 and (3) have
an inalienable duty to protect lands in the public trust—i.e., the jus publicum.69
After these cases, virtually every state in the union modified its inherited English
common law to curtail riparian rights for private owners and expand them for
public access and use.70 The Law Court, however, in a series of cases handed
down since the mid-1980s, blazed a different trail, by declining to interpret the
scope of public rights within the intertidal zone to include an easement for general
62. Herbert E. Locke, Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 ME. L. REV.
148, 149 (1919).
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 184 (Me. 1989).
65. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 451 (1882).
66. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 58, at 61-62 (citing to State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952);
Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union Wharf, 26 Me. 384 (1847); Duncan v. Sylvester, 24 Me. 482 (1844);
Lapish v. President of Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85 (1831)).
67. See, e.g., id.; see also, e.g., McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 9, 28 A.3d 620.
68. See Craig, supra note 58, at 5-7 & nn.13 & 16 (citing to Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40
(1894); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380
(1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891)).
69. On the distinct property rights of jus publicum and jus privatum:
[P]ublic trust land is viewed as being ‘vested with two titles: the jus publicum, the public's right to use
and enjoy trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public
purposes, and the jus privatum, or the private proprietary rights in the use and possession of trust lands.’
In other words, while in many ways the jus publicum title may be considered something less than fee
simple ownership, it also cannot be sold.
Michael P. Dixon, Drawing Lines in the Disappearing Sand: A Re-Evaluation of Shoreline Rights and
Regimes A Quarter Century After Bell v. Town of Wells, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 481, 490 (2011)
(internal citations omitted).
70. Id. at 491-92.
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public recreation. In what have become known notoriously as the “Moody Beach
decisions,”71 the court stated that the public right did not extend to “bathing,
sunbathing, and [recreational] walking on privately owned intertidal lands.”72
The court’s pronouncement—that the public’s right to access and use the
intertidal zone is necessarily constrained by the plain meaning of the Colonial
Ordinance—was a major deviation from its earlier case law73 and has been a source
of significant controversy. Although the debate in Maine has revolved around the
origins of public and private property rights to the intertidal zone and whether the
court erred in finding that the Colonial Ordinance granted title to the intertidal zone
to private landowners, the controversy has also focused on the scope of the public’s
rights in light of the Ordinance’s explicit language, its underlying purpose, and the
evolution of Maine’s common law since the Ordinance’s incorporation.74 In
essence, the Moody Beach cases triggered an ongoing debate about whether the
public trust should be construed narrowly and consistent with the Ordinance’s
expressly referred rights of “fishing,” “fowling,” and the passage of boats and
vessels (typically denoted as the right of “navigation”); whether the public’s rights
should be construed consistent with the Ordinance’s underlying purpose to enable
access to the ocean in order to obtain sustenance or economic benefit; or whether
the public’s rights should be interpreted more broadly through the lens of the jus
publicum, irrespective of the Ordinance.
Nonetheless, the Law Court has reaffirmed the Moody Beach holding in
several cases since 1989, framing the public interest in the intertidal zone as a
relatively narrow right limited to “fishing, fowling, and navigation, or other
activities with the permission of the landowner.”75
The court has also
71. See Orlando E. Delogu, An Argument to the State of Maine, the Town of Wells, and Other Maine
Towns Similarly Situated: Buy the Foreshore—Now, 45 ME. L. REV. 243, 243 (1993) (observing the
usage of the common name); see also Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986) (deciding
procedural issues in the principal case); Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter
Bell II] (addressing the balance of public and private rights in the intertidal zone).
72. Bell II, supra note 71, at 176. See also id. at 173 (“The terms ‘fishing,’ ‘fowling,’ and
‘navigation,’ liberally interpreted, delimit the public’s right to use [the intertidal zone].”).
73. See James v. Inhabitants of the Town of W. Bath, 437 A.2d 863, 865 (Me. 1981) (“A consistent
theme in the decisional law is the concept that Maine’s tidal lands and resources . . . are held by the
State in a public trust for the people of the State . . . .”); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607 (Me.
1981) (noting that other public uses may be recognized in intertidal zone, beyond historical purposes for
which public trust principle was developed).
74. See Mark Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A
Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115 (1990) (arguing for examination of the
“historical precedents upon which the Ordinance is based”); Orlando E. Delogu, Intellectual
Indifference—Intellectual Dishonesty: The Colonial Ordinance, The Equal Footing Doctrine, and The
Maine Law Court, 42 ME. L. REV. 43, 44 (1990) (arguing that the Bell II court failed to “examine or
appreciate the intent and purpose of the Colonial Ordinance”); Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use,
and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5, 35 (1990) (“Contrary to suggestions that the Colonial
Ordinance of 1641-47 abrogated the English common law respecting the foreshore, the
fundamental principle of English law was in fact incorporated into the Colonial Ordinance.”); but
see Sidney St. F. Thaxter, Will Bell v. Town of Wells be Eroded with Time?, 57 ME. L. REV. 117 (2005)
(responding to critics of Bell II and arguing that decision correctly applies the existing law of private
property, of which the Ordinance is just one source).
75. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 33 n.8, 823 A.2d 551;
see also, e.g., Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶¶ 34,, 760 A.2d 232 (finding that prescriptive
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acknowledged that the public’s interest is further “subject to the [adjacent upland or
intertidal land]owner’s ‘right to wharf out to the navigable portion of the body of
water,”76 even though “[t]hese rights have long been subject to reasonable
regulation . . . to protect the public’s rights, pursuant to the public trust doctrine.”77
C. Post-Moody Beach Elucidation?
The Law Court revisited the scope of Maine’s public trust doctrine last year in
McGarvey v. Whittredge when several owners of oceanfront property bordering
Passamaquoddy Bay in the Town of Eastport filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking a determination that their neighbors, who operated a commercial scuba
diving business, had no right to cross the intertidal zone to access the ocean.78 The
unanimous Law Court held that the public’s right included the “right of the public
to pass over the intertidal zone to reach the ocean in order to scuba dive.”79
However, the court declined to speak to whether the public has a trust right to any
other uses of the intertidal zone. The court’s equally split opinion reached this
holding on starkly divergent reasoning.
While solidly affirming that the upland owner’s fee title to the intertidal zone
was an artifact of the Colonial Ordinance, Chief Justice Saufley, joined by Justices
Mead and Jabar, acknowledged not only that Hale’s treatise suggests that a public
right of access over the zone existed long before the Ordinance’s enactment,80 but
also that “nothing in the Colonial Ordinance, or the pronouncement of the common
law that followed in the decades after [its] expiration . . . evidenced an intent to
change or limit the jus publicum—the public’s right in the intertidal lands—except
to the extent that those rights might interfere with the right of the landowner to
wharf out.”81 Moreover, Justice Saufley rejected the “rigid interpretation of the
public trust rights” championed in the Moody Beach decisions as exclusively
restricted to fishing, fowling, and navigation,82 and instead reasoned that the
respondents’ underlying purpose for crossing the intertidal zone—namely, to reach
the ocean to scuba dive—was among the purposes consistent with the jus
easement granted general recreational public right across dry sand portion of intertidal zone, but
declining to extend the public trust doctrine holding in Bell II); but see Norton v. Town of Long Island,
2005 ME 109, ¶ 33, 883 A.2d 889 (noting the continued viability of Bell II, but also observing that
Maine is unusual among other states in this area of law); Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 50, 760 A.2d 232
(Saufley, J., concurring) (stating that Bell II should be overruled).
76. Conservation Law Found., 2003 ME 62, ¶ 36, 823 A.2d 551 (quoting Great Cove Boat Club v.
Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 95 (Me. 1996)). The common law provides owners of land abutting
a body of water certain rights beyond those of the public, including
(1) the right to have the water remain in place and retain, as nearly as possible, its natural character, (2)
the right of access to the water; (3) subject to reasonable restrictions, the right to wharf out to the
navigable portion of the body of water, and (4) the right of free use of the water immediately adjoining
the property for the transaction of business associated with wharves.
Great Cove Boat Club, 672 A.2d at 95.
77. Britton v. Donnell, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 8, 12 A.3d 39; see also Great Cove Boat Club, 672 A.2d at
95 (“[T]he right to wharf-out, [is] not absolute, but rather [is] subject to [] reasonable regulation . . . .”).
78. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, 28 A.3d 620.
79. Id. ¶ 10.
80. Id. ¶ 18 & n.9.
81. Id. ¶ 35.
82. Id. ¶ 56.
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publicum—namely, the right to cross the zone “to reach the ocean for ocean-based
activities.”83 In essence, Justice Saufley espoused a fundamentally purpose-driven
doctrinal approach to interpreting the public’s intertidal rights.
In contrast, Justice Levy, joined by Justices Alexander and Gorman,
emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis and the import to society of a stable
property rights regime84 as the basis for essentially upholding the Moody Beach
decisions and circumscribing the public’s right to the intertidal zone by “the terms
‘fishing’ fowling, and navigation.’”85
Even so, the concurring opinion
acknowledged that the Ordinance’s triad “should be given a ‘sympathetically
generous’ and broad interpretation . . . so as to account for evolving social and
commercial circumstances.”86 Then, applying the “expansive and adaptive force”
of the common law, Justice Levy reasoned that scuba diving was an activity within
the ambit of the right to navigation and concluded that traversing across the
intertidal zone for that purpose was incidental to that right.87 Thus, Justice Levy
championed what might be loosely characterized as an elastic, activities-based
doctrinal approach to interpreting the public’s intertidal rights.
Despite its divergent reasoning, the McGarvey court adhered to a long line of
cases wherein it resolved water rights controversies through a string of functional
definitions. For example, while the Law Court has affirmed in all three water
categories88 the common right to fish and navigate the state’s navigable waters,89 it
has recognized the public’s right to cut ice, bathe, skate, ride upon the ice, and take
water for domestic or agricultural purposes or for use in the arts only on great
ponds.90 Consequently, McGarvey has done little to ameliorate the pragmatic
effect of the Moody Beach decisions. Even if lawyers were to take their cues from
the Chief Justice’s opinion, which seems to liberate courts from a strict Moody
Beach-style interpretation of the Colonial Ordinance, it gives little guidance to
what other uses of the intertidal zone will fall within the jus publicum. As before,
lawyers will likely continue to resort to heavy use of the “analogize-anddistinguish” tool in the advocacy toolbox (depending on which side of the “v.” they
represent). Accordingly, a party seeking to establish a new public activity in the
intertidal zone will argue that the activity is similar to digging for worms91 or

83. Id. ¶¶ 49-51. The Chief Justice made clear that the foundational purpose for the public’s right to
the intertidal was to access the ocean and tidal zone, stating that “[t]here can be no question that . . . the
public has a right to use the ocean itself.” Id. ¶ 12.
84. Id. ¶¶ 63-67 (Levy, J., concurring in the judgment).
85. Id. ¶ 59 (quoting Bell II, supra note 71, at 173).
86. Id. ¶ 68 (quoting Bell II, supra note 71, at 173).
87. Id. ¶¶ 76-77.
88. See supra Part III.A (identifying the three categories).
89. See Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 312, 147 A.2d 455, 458 (1958) (recognizing rights to use
“great ponds,” including right to fish); Moulton v. Libbey, 37 Me. 472, 485 (1854) (recognizing a right
to fish in “seas or creeks or arms thereof”); Moor v. Veazie, 32 Me. 341, 356 (recognizing a right to
navigate on all navigable waters, including “lakes and fresh water rivers, which are navigable”).
90. Gratto v. Palangi, 154 Me. 308, 313, 147 A.2d 455, 458 (1958) (recognizing rights of
swimming, boating, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, riding upon the ice, and taking water for
domestic or agricultural purposes or for use in the arts in great ponds); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28,
71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950) (recognizing a right to cut ice upon great ponds).
91. State v. Lemar, 87 A.2d 886, 887 (Me. 1952).
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clams,92 recreational power boating,93 traveling over frozen waters,94 discharging
and taking on boat passengers,95 driving or resting cattle,96 and scuba diving97—
uses the court has accepted as within the sphere of the enumerated public trust
rights. Conversely, the other side will argue that the activity is more like cutting
ice,98 harvesting mussel-bed manure,99 and bathing100—uses the court has, to date,
rejected. Thus, even though Maine’s property framework of riparian and littoral
rights originates in “established” common law,101 the court continues to resolve
many of its water-related property rights controversies in a largely reactive, use-byuse fashion.
Notwithstanding the Law Court’s use-by-use approach to resolving intertidal
rights controversies, McGarvey sheds light on two key public policies that are at
the heart of much of Maine’s modern water rights jurisprudence: (1) society’s
interest in a stable and predictable property rights regime,102 and (2) society’s
interest in a continually evolving common law that “reflect[s] the realities of a
changing world.”103 The McGarvey court recognized these policies as the
motivation behind both the fundamentally purpose-driven and the elastic, activitiesbased doctrinal approach to resolving intertidal rights conflicts; however, each
opinion unmistakably emphasized one policy at the expense of the other. Thus, the
court did not reach consensus, or even majority agreement, as to how a balance
among these policies ought to be struck.
In the end, McGarvey offers neither much predictability nor much evolutionary
accommodation when it comes to resolving use conflicts in the intertidal zone, as
both doctrinal approaches leave unclear what emerging uses might fall within or
outside the scope of the public trust. Moreover, the modern judicial method, when
combined with an inconsistent administrative approach to resolving such conflicts
(discussed immediately below), serves to augment the policy discord.

92. Moulton, 37 Me. at 493-94.
93. See Gratto, 154 Me. at 312-14, 147 A.2d at 458-60.
94. See French v. Camp, 18 Me. 433, 434-35 (1841).
95. See Andrews v. King, 124 Me. 361, 362-64, 129 A. 298,299 (1925).
96. See Bell II, supra note 71, at 173 n.15.
97. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 77, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
98. See Bell II, supra note 71, at 188 n.13 (Wathen, J., dissenting).
99. See Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 536, 498 (1900).
100. Bell II, supra note 71, at 176.
101. Whether that common law ought to originate in the Colonial Ordinance, the jus publicum, or a
combination of both is likely to remain fodder for infinite academic and courtroom debate. This
academic debate is not modern. From as early as the turn of the 20th century, this Journal has published
commentaries focusing on the origins of Maine’s common law in this regard. See, e.g., Locke, supra
note 62, at 152.
102. McGarvey, 2011 ME 97, ¶¶ 64-65, 28 A.3d 620 (Levy, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 70 (Levy, J., dissenting) (“The common law requires courts to account for
‘the ever varying circumstances of new cases presented and . . . the newly developed industries of the
age [while not] setting aside its plain doctrines because they are not in accord with our own views of
what it should be.” (internal citations omitted)).
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IV. THE ADMINISTRATIVE OVERLAY:
MAINE’S STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PATCHWORK
Federal, state, and municipal entities play a key role in regulating land uses in
the state and, in doing so, can define the scope of private property and public use
rights. Indeed, water rights, like all other rights, are subject to such reasonable
regulations as are essential to the general public welfare.104 However, the
concurrent regulatory authority of many agencies at different levels of
government—and with sometimes disparate objectives—presents the risk that
regulators will pull at the strands of the property rights fiber in different directions.
The overlay applicable to emerging water uses illustrates that Maine’s riparian and
littoral rights regime has certainly not curtailed this risk.
A. Federal Review: The Army Corps of Engineers
At the federal level, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”)
has jurisdiction to regulate waterway obstructions over all navigable waters of the
United States.105 The Corps generally defines navigable waters as “those waters
that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have
been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign
commerce.”106 Accordingly, in Maine, the Corps can regulate emerging water uses
such as dockominiums located on any tidal waters and their tributaries to the head
of tide, as well on any major river of the state and on Lake Umbagog.107
While the primary focus of the Corps’ regulatory program has been to
safeguard navigation,108 a relatively recent secondary objective involves the

104. Of course, the statutory and regulatory overlay is not free of judicial scrutiny: “A state
legislature’s or judiciary’s action amending prior state property law pertaining to water rights may . . .
have the effect of taking the property without compensation where those rights were firmly vested
through reliance on the prior state law and the subsequent legislative or judicial action places ‘a
sufficient cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs so as to interfere substantially with the financing of
improvements or any potential sale of their lands.’” James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental
Interference with the Use of Water: When Do Unconstitutional “Takings” Occur? 9 U. DENV. WATER
L. REV. 1, 25-26 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
105. 33 U.S.C.A. § 403 (2001 & Supp. 2012). Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations
Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified at § 403), grants the Corps broad authority to
regulate waterway obstructions. See United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1992). Section 403
codifies section 10 of the Act; accordingly, Corps permits that are issued for docks, marinas, and similar
structures under § 403 are commonly referred to as section 10 permits. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Peters,
United States v. Alaska: Section 10 Permits, the Territorial Sea, and Federalism, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL
L.J. 59, 60 (1994).
106. Corps of Engineers, Definition of Navigable Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 329.4
(2011).
107. See What Are the Limits of the Corps Jurisdiction?, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS—NEW
ENGLAND DISTRICT, 4 (Jul. 2012),
http://www.nae.usace.army.mil/Regulatory/JD/JurisdictionLimits.pdf.
108. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 194-95 (1967) (affirming the
propriety of Corps action to remove a sunken barge containing containers of liquid chlorine from the
Mississippi River); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 405 (1929) (“[Sections 9 and 10 of] [t]he act of
Congress of 1899 . . . [looked] to the regulation, prevention, and removal by federal authority of
obstructions to navigation and alteration of capacity of the navigable waters of the United States . . . .”).
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protection of the nation’s water resources.109 Thus, the Corps’ general regulatory
policies applicable to the review of all of its permit applications invoke a “public
interest review,” which calls for an “evaluation of the probable impacts . . . of the
proposed activity and its intended use on the public interest” through “a careful
weighing” of public and private interest factors.110 These factors include
“conservation, economics . . . general environmental concerns . . . navigation . . .
considerations of property ownership, and, in general, the needs and welfare of the
people.”111 The Corps’ general regulatory policies also include consideration of
property ownership, recognizing that the “right to reasonable private use . . . is
subject to the rights and interests of the public in the navigable and other waters of
the United States” and that “[a] riparian landowner’s general right of access to
navigable waters . . . is subject to the similar rights of access held by nearby
riparian landowners and to the general public’s right of navigation on the water
surface.”112 The policies stress that projects which create “undue interference with
access to, or use of, navigable waters” are not likely to be authorized.113
However, the agency’s general regulatory policies also emphasize that Corps
permits do not convey any property rights or exclusive privileges, and stress that
the agency will not undertake any independent reviews of an applicant’s
affirmation that he or she possesses “the requisite property interest” to undertake
the project.114 Consequently, any section 10 permits issued by the Corps for
emerging water uses in Maine would likely presume the presence of clear title, and
would instead focus on whether or not the proposals would create physical barriers
to the navigable channels of waters.
B. State Review: The Bureau of Parks and Lands
The Bureau of Parks and Lands (“the Bureau”), within Maine’s Department of
Conservation, administers intertidal and submerged lands owned by the state.115 In
general, submerged land consists of land from the mean low-water mark out to the
seaward boundary of coastal waters, land below the mean low-water mark of tidal
rivers, land below the natural mean low-water mark of great ponds, and the
riverbeds of international boundary rivers.116
As discussed in Part III, title to Maine’s submerged lands has long been held
by the state, according to Maine’s enduring common law tradition rooted in Hale’s
property rights doctrine, whereas title to intertidal lands is generally privately held
by the owner of the upland. In fact, in 1989, the court went so far as to find the
Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act (PTILA)—enacted by the Maine Legislature in
109. See Cheung, supra note 38, at 845.
110. Corps of Engineers, General Regulatory Policies, 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.1(a)(1), 320.4(a)(1) (2011).
111. Id. § 320.4(a)(1).
112. Id. § 320.4(g)(1), (3).
113. Id. § 320.4(g)(3).
114. Id. § 320.4(g)(6).
115. P.L. 1998, ch. 678 (codified at 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 1802, 1862-1867 (2005 & Supp. 2011)). This
statute is commonly referred to as the “Submerged and Intertidal Lands Act.” See, e.g., Britton v.
Donnell, 2011 ME 16, ¶ 4, 12 A.3d 39.
116. JEFFREY A. THALER & GREGORY M. CUNNINGHAM, MAINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK
§ 5.2.1, at 102-103 (2d ed. 2002).
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1986 largely in response to the court’s first Moody Beach decision and declaring
that the “intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public trust,” including a
“right to use intertidal land for recreation”117—a facially unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation because it functionally created an
unlimited public recreational easement that went beyond the recognized common
law right of fishing, fowling, and navigation.118 The court was heavily criticized
for failing to recognize both that (1) the police power could be applied to limit the
potential nuisance effects of public recreation and (2) the legislative branch ought
to play its judicially-recognized role in defining the scope of the common law
public rights.119 Nonetheless, the lasting effect of the Moody Beach decisions was
to suppress the authority of the state’s executive and legislative branches to
interpret the scope of the public trust beyond the court’s construction of the
Colonial Ordinance. As a result, the Bureau’s authority to regulate emerging uses
in the intertidal zone is limited to the rare instance where the state holds fee title to
intertidal land—i.e., when it acquires such land through fee purchase.120
In those rare instances, pursuant to legislative authority under the Submerged
and Intertidal Lands Act (SILA),121 the Bureau is empowered to transfer the state’s
interest in intertidal lands to private entities under certain conditions, as it may do
with its submerged lands. For example, as part of its submerged lands leasing
program, the Bureau may lease the right, or grant assignable thirty-year easements,
to construct “causeways, bridges, marinas, wharves, docks, pilings [or] moorings”
on state-owned submerged and intertidal lands.122 The Bureau may refuse to issue
such a lease if it determines that the lease would “unreasonably interfere” with
“navigation . . . fishing or other existing marine uses of the area, [or] ingress and
egress of riparian owners.”123 Likewise, the Bureau may refuse to issue either a
lease or a term easement if it determines that such a lease or easement would
unreasonably interfere with “customary or traditional public access ways to or
public trust rights in, on or over the intertidal or submerged lands and the waters
above those lands.”124
In accordance with the SILA, the Bureau promulgated rules to “ensure a
consistent and standard approach to the management of the Submerged Lands of
Maine . . . .”125 Under these rules, the Bureau will issue a lease or grant a term
easement if it finds that the proposed use of the state-owned lands (1) will not
“unreasonably interfere” with, inter alia, “navigation,” “ingress and egress of
riparian owners,” and “customary or traditional public access ways to, or public
trust rights in, on or over Submerged Lands and the waters above those lands”; and

117. 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571 & 573(1)(B) (2005).
118. Bell II, supra note 71, at 176-79.
119. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5, 510 (1990) (“With respect to state tidelands law and the role the legislature plays in defining the scope of
common law public rights, the Law Court was deafeningly silent.”).
120. See THALER & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 116, § 5.2.1 at 104.
121. 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 1801, 1803, 1862 (2005 & Supp. 2011).
122. Id. §§ 1862(2), (3).
123. Id. § 1862(2)(A)(6).
124. Id. §§ 1862(2), (3).
125. Bureau of Parks & Lands, Submerged Lands Rules, 04-059 C.M.R. Ch. 053, § 1.2 (2011).
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(2) is not otherwise “contrary to the public interest.”126 In addition to specifying
the standards of review, the area of lands conveyed by leases and easements, and
renewal and termination provisions, the rules stipulate that the Bureau may require
mitigation measures such as boat launching ramps, parking spaces, or public
walkways from the lessee or easement holder to compensate the public for the loss
of its customary access rights.127 Notably, the rules also specify that any interest
conveyed by a lease or easement in state-owned submerged lands may not be
severed from the title in the adjacent upland without invalidating the lease or
extinguishing the easement interest.128
Moreover, the use of state-owned submerged and intertidal lands for
dockominiums is plainly within the statutory authority of the SILA. The Act, for
example, defines dockominiums as “slip space that is sold or leased by a lessee of
submerged lands to a boat or vessel owner for more than one year.”129 The SILA
also contemplates how the fee structure should be calculated for dockominiumrelated slips that are not rented or leased to the general public.130 And, in 1988, the
Maine Legislature enacted a statutory “brake” on the development of
dockominiums on state-owned submerged and intertidal lands,131 thereby
indicating that the pre-1988 regulations also contemplated dockominiums as a
permitted use on these lands.
Accordingly, when the Bureau’s regulatory authority under SILA is triggered,
administrative consideration of the impacts of proposed dockominiums and other
emerging uses on the public trust appears, on its face, quite rigorous. The
advantages of working within an established operative regulatory framework are
reason alone for the Bureau to be charged with assessing the public trust impacts of
all proposed shoreland structures, regardless of whether they are sited in the
intertidal zone or on submerged land. (Besides, the Bureau’s review will be
invoked with some frequency anyway because, as discussed in Part II.B, shoreland
structures typically occupy or alter some portion of submerged lands—over which
the Bureau has clear authority—in order to create access from the upland to the
ocean.) But given the Law Court’s longstanding declaration that private
landowners hold fee title to the intertidal zone, combined with its recent declaration
that the PTILA is unconstitutional, it is not surprising that this regulatory trigger is
rarely pulled beyond the confines of Maine’s submerged lands.
C. Municipal Review: Home Rule Authority
Municipal review of emerging water uses can be as varied as the
municipalities themselves. This is because municipalities are authorized under
126. Id. § 1.7(C)(2), (3), (9).
127. Id. § 1.6(B)(18).
128. Id. § 1.6(B)(1)(b).
129. 12 M.R.S.A. § 1862(1)(B) (emphasis added).
130. Id. § 1862(1)(D).
131. An amendment to Title 12 halted the development of dockominiums “where a person or entity
obtained a lease of submerged or intertidal lands for a period of 30 years and then sold portions to
individuals using a condominium concept for use as docking space for boats.” CASPAR F. COWAN & J.
GORDON SCANNELL, JR., 1 MAINE PRACTICE SERIES: REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE § 15:3 (2d ed.
2007).
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Maine’s home rule laws132 to “exercise any power or function . . . which is not
denied to them” by the Maine Legislature.133 Accordingly, although no Maine
municipality appears to have promulgated rules specifically related to
dockominium developments to date, most towns and cities have enacted general
land use standards and permitting requirements that, when combined with specific
standards applicable to uses similar to dockominiums (such as commercial
marinas), establish a regulatory framework by which municipal officials could
review, and approve or reject, proposed dockominium developments.
The Town of Kittery, for example, has adopted a land use and development
ordinance that establishes a range of land use zones and identifies the uses allowed
in each zone upon receipt of a permit, by special exception, or through a variance
process.134 Under this framework, the Town accommodates, under certain
circumstances and only in certain zones, functionally water-dependent uses135 and
private marinas owned or used by a private group, club, association, “or other legal
entity’s organization” primarily as moorings or docking facilities.136 Thus, the
Town could grant a permit for the construction of a marina-turned-dockominium
on its shores by interpreting its ordinance, in light of these two definitions, to
include dockominiums among permitted uses.137 However, absent more explicit
regulatory language, the Town is not likely to address issues surrounding the form
of ownership contemplated for the dockominium development beyond establishing
that the proposed developer of the dockominium is, in fact, the fee owner of the
shoreland adjoining the river and that title will eventually transfer from the
developer to the dockominium association.
The Town of Kittery is far from unusual. In fact, any land use framework that
relies on static lists of land and water uses will suffer a similar fate of needing to fit
proverbial “square uses” into “round zones” in order to adapt to a dynamic world of
evolving and emerging uses. The Town’s framework nonetheless illustrates a
broader point: Although Maine communities can, and often do, regulate land and
water uses in starkly varied ways, when it comes to emerging water uses,
municipalities rarely if ever appear to question the effects of such uses on public
trust interests—despite having the home rule authority to do so. Thus, even though
dockominiums are likely to significantly alter the property rights of Maine’s
waters, municipal reviews of such proposals are usually limited to establishing a
132. Home rule powers are granted to municipalities by the Constitution of Maine. ME. CONST. art.
VIII, pt. 2. These powers are codified at 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2101-2109 (2011 & Supp. 2011).
133. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (2011). This power is broad: There is, for example, “a rebuttable
presumption that any ordinance enacted under this section [by a municipality] is a valid exercise of a
municipality’s home rule authority.” See id. § 3001(2) (granting the presumption with respect to the
home rule ordinance power defined in § 3001). Moreover, unless the ordinance in question is held to
“frustrate the purpose of any state law,” the courts must presume that the Legislature did not implicitly
deny any power granted to municipalities under Title 30-A. Id. § 3001(3).
134. Kittery, Me., Land Use & Dev. Code, tit. 16 §§ 1.1 - 16.7.3.5.1 (2010), available at
http://www.kitteryme.gov/Pages/KitteryME_TownCode/Title%2016%20%20Part%201.pdf [hereinafter
Kittery Code].
135. E.g., uses that must be located on submerged lands or that require direct access to waters, such
as commercial and recreational boating facilities, waterfront dock and port facilities—but not marinas.
136. See Kittery Code, supra note 134, § 16.2.2 (definition of “private marina use structure”).
137. See id.
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permit applicant’s right, title, or interest to the shoreland adjoining the
dockominium, in the form of deeds, leases, or option agreements, and possibly to
the submerged lands, in the form of a lease from the Bureau.
D. Regulatory Discord
An examination of regulation of dockominiums at the federal, state, and
municipal levels reveals both gaps in jurisdiction among these three levels of
government and disparate treatment of water-related property rights where
jurisdictions overlap. For example, the Corps retains jurisdiction over the
construction of dockominiums on navigable rivers, tidal waters, and the intertidal
zone, but not on great ponds. In contrast, the Bureau has jurisdiction over
dockominiums on tidal waters (submerged lands) and those facilities that extend
below the low-water mark of great ponds, but not on navigable rivers or most
intertidal lands. As a result, dockominium proposals on some categories of public
waters are—at least ostensibly—subject to review by the Corps, others by the
Bureau, and still others by both agencies. To complicate matters, municipalities
may, but are not required to, exert home rule authority over any proposed
dockominium development within their municipal boundaries.
Moreover, even though both the Corps and the Bureau are called upon in
statute and rule to weigh the potential impacts of dockominiums on existing public
property interests, these jurisdictional problems combine with practical and legal
limitations on undertaking property ownership assessments of private ownership
rights and public trust rights. Accordingly, the Corps does not undertake
independent evaluations of asserted property interests, and it is at best unclear
whether such evaluations would be solicited by the Bureau. At present, these
governmental agencies are in no position to protect the public trust from the
potential ill effects of emerging water uses and associated facilities, or to assuage
the incremental privatization of Maine’s intertidal zone.
V. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN THE INTERTIDAL ZONE,
AND THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED JUDICIAL VOICE
The dockominium serves as a useful illustration of the layers of legal
uncertainty facing public and private entities in Maine who wish to make novel use
of the intertidal zone.
At the administrative level, the problems appear primarily in the form of
jurisdictional disparity.138 The central issue, however, is not that the three levels of
government overlap in their regulatory orbit. After all, different layers of
government can and often do coordinate reviews of development proposals.
Rather, the problem is that administrative agencies give unpredictable depth and
breadth of consideration to the public’s interest in water resources when evaluating
emerging water use proposals. Such incongruent, inconsistent, and all-too-often
nonexistent regulatory assessment of public trust rights leaves a path of uncertainty
with respect to the administrative protections offered to the public’s interest in the
intertidal zone whenever a proposal for an emerging water use is presented.
138. See supra Part IV.
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The case-by-case judicial approach to resolving water use conflicts139
compounds this administrative uncertainty. In McGarvey, Chief Justice Saufley
frankly acknowledged “the inconsistency of this incremental jurisprudential
approach,” and recognized the need for a “gradual evolution” of the common
law.140 However, the court’s two divergent doctrines in McGarvey do little to
illuminate whether the court will, in fact, depart from the rigid Moody Beach
holding in favor of a clearer view of the scope of the public’s interests in the
intertidal zone. Moreover, even if the court were to eventually embrace the
reasoning in Chief Justice Saufley’s opinion, little guidance exists therein as to
which types of public uses implicating the intertidal zone will be found consistent
with the jus publicum and within the realm of “ocean-based activities,” and which
types of emerging private uses will be found to interfere with the public trust.
Consequently, Maine is left with an approach to public and private intertidal
rights that, on the one hand, leaves the public with an unclear path as to what new
public uses of the intertidal are within the scope of the public’s rights and, on the
other hand, leaves private entities with uncertainty as to what emerging private uses
may be subject to regulations aimed at protecting the public’s interests.
A. Incomplete Administrative Solutions
There are, of course, several fixes to some of the more egregious jurisdictional
holes in the administrative reviews of emerging water uses. While an obvious
patch would be to expand the jurisdictional scope of the federal or state agencies
that presently have a role in evaluating many emerging water uses, this approach
would likely be fraught with political challenges and institutional hurdles and, in
any event, may not be the most efficient method of solving the problem. Efforts at
expanding the jurisdictional scope of the Corps are likely to be met with significant
political resistance and, consequently, may have little chance of success. And any
future legislative attempts to broaden or clarify the Bureau’s purpose and mission
might be viewed as a duplicitous effort to undermine the court’s 1989 Moody
Beach decision invalidating the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act on
constitutional takings grounds, and could run the risk of another separation of
powers battle between Maine’s judicial and legislative branches.
Alternatively, municipalities whose boundaries adjoin coastal waters could
exercise their home rule authority to resolve some of the administrative problems
associated with emerging water uses. For instance, municipalities could adopt a
dynamic zoning and regulatory framework by which municipal officials or boards
are empowered to review, and approve or reject, proposed structural development
associated with emerging water uses. To be effective, such a framework would
need to include explicit analysis of the impacts of proposed water uses on public
trust interests, rather than merely requiring developers to demonstrate right, title, or
interest to the adjoining shoreland. Although a municipal ordinance that brings
emerging uses into the regulated sphere would not eliminate the need to regularly
update review standards to address issues specific to already-identified emerging

139. See supra Part III.
140. McGarvey v. Whittredge, 2011 ME 97, ¶ 11 n.5, 28 A.3d 620.
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uses such as dockominiums, it would certainly ameliorate the “square use, round
zone” phenomenon.
Although establishing meaningful municipal control over emerging water uses
could certainly introduce an incongruent patchwork of town-by-town regulations,
the benefits are at least three-fold. First, Maine’s deep-rooted culture of local
control would serve as a natural cushion against the type of political and
administrative opposition that state- or federal-level jurisdictional expansions
would likely face. Second, the residents of the municipalities adjoining coastal
resources are, in many respects, most likely to be directly affected by decisions
about the allocation of water-related interests between public and private entities.
After all, residents are the most likely fee owners of the intertidal zone at issue, and
residents are the most likely users of the public trust due to their geographic
proximity to the resource. As a result, municipalities are well-positioned to do the
kind of balancing of interests that is called for in resolving water use conflicts.141
Finally, addressing the problem of emerging water uses at the municipal level
would present the opportunity for a varied and customized set of solutions to the
allocation problem. In other words, there exists the opportunity for some creative
bargaining.
Unlike the situation in McGarvey, where public actors were allegedly intruding
on a private right, emerging uses are more apt to trigger municipal involvement
when a private actor allegedly intrudes on the public interest. Dockominiums are a
case in point: Under a well-written, forward-thinking ordinance, a developer
seeking municipal approval for a change in use of an existing water-based facility
or for the construction a new facility would need to address the possibility that the
proposal could affect the public’s rights. The municipality would have an
obligation to evaluate the impacts of a proposed dockominium on these public
interests, and the ordinance would clarify the breadth and depth of this obligation.
If any adverse impacts were found, a municipality might be justified in simply
denying the proposal. However, a well-written ordinance could make possible
other forms of redress, including approval contingent upon the implementation of
impact minimization and mitigation measures such as pedestrian public access
easements across swaths of the intertidal zone and set-asides of a certain number of
dock slips for public use. Regulatory exactions such as these, which are aimed at
offsetting the impacts of development on public resources, are within the scope of a
municipality’s home rule authority. Moreover, they would not cloud title so as to
cause an unconstitutional taking of property, as long as a clear nexus exists
between the exactions and the impacts and as long as the exactions are
proportionate to the projected impacts of the development.142 At the very least,
resolving water use conflicts through local decision making—and guided by
ordinances tailored to the needs of the directly-affected community—would

141. Local control is generally seen as beneficial because it fosters democratic tendencies, allows
broad participation in government, and allows people to arrange their local conditions as they desire.
See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 67-94 (Arthur Goldhammer, trans.,
Library of America 2004).
142. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994).

2012]

FISHING, FOWLING, AND DOCKOMINIUMS

341

engender much-needed open discourse about the appropriate allocation of waterrelated property rights among public and private entities.
B. The Need for a Unified Judicial Voice
Municipalities have broad power to protect the public interest when there is a
direct structural intrusion upon the public’s interest to access the ocean; however,
even the best administrative patches are not enough to fully address the legal
ailments associated with public trust rights in Maine’s intertidal zone. As
discussed in Part V.A, municipal solutions under home rule authority would not
resolve the McGarvey-type problems: public intrusion on private rights. And,
absent additional guidance from the Law Court, even those municipalities with
well-drafted ordinances would need to speculate (either as part of rulemaking or
during post-rulemaking application) as to which water-based public uses should fall
within or outside municipal considerations when evaluating the impacts of
proposed water-based uses on the public trust.
Given the court’s divergent views of the scope of public trust rights in
McGarvey, this kind of municipal speculation carries with it some obvious risks.
An overly broad interpretation of the public trust might lead municipalities to
demand exactions that are not proportionate to the impacts, whereas an overly
narrow interpretation might lead to insufficient mitigation measures and,
consequently, harm to public interests through excessive privatization. Moreover,
saddling municipalities (or any administrative agency for that matter) with the task
of setting the scope of the public trust would be a misplaced abdication of judicial
responsibility, and would inevitably engender heterogeneous, town-by-town
interpretations of uses that fall within or outside the protections of the public trust.
This is hardly the formula for a stable and predictable property rights regime. For
these reasons, the difficult task of striking the proper balance with respect to public
and private interests in the intertidal zone remains best placed with the Law Court.
Many of the challenges faced by municipalities and other administrators would be
eased if the court were to present a unified judicial voice regarding the scope of the
public trust and the related balancing of society’s interests in a stable, yet evolving
property rights regime.
Auspiciously, the two fundamental objectives underlying the Law Court’s
purpose-driven and elastic, action-based doctrinal approaches to resolving water
rights controversies in McGarvey can be harmonized. Despite their seeming
inconsistency, society’s interest in a stable and predictable property rights regime is
not inherently in dissonance with society’s interest in an evolving common law that
embraces emerging water uses, whether public or private. Both of these objectives
could be honored if, rather than evaluating emerging uses on a case-by-case basis
and with only static precedent as guidance, the court were to embrace a factorsbased approach to assessing novel uses of the intertidal zone.
These factors do not necessarily need to deviate from the Colonial Ordinance’s
three descriptive terms—so long as there is recognition that “fishing, fowling, and
navigation” are to be interpreted as comprising certain classes of public uses. For
example, instead of itemizing the ways humans have or will “navigate” through or
across the intertidal zone, the court could set forth performance-based evaluation

342

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1

factors such as whether the use in controversy involves traversing the intertidal
zone for the primary purpose of accessing upland, submerged land, or ocean.
Likewise, the court could assert that uses involving the harvesting of plant or
animal matter attached to the floor of the intertidal zone are outside the scope of
“fishing” and “fowling,” rather than listing the various flora and fauna that humans
now or in the future might wish to harvest. The factors could, of course, also be
based on other considerations, such as the underlying purposes of the Colonial
Ordinance or principles of nuisance law, such as whether the use is a transient use
causing de minimis nuisance on private ownership rights.
Judicial enumeration of such factors would bring about much-needed
predictability to Maine’s intertidal rights framework by making use of a familiar
analytical tool to book-end the scope of the public trust in Maine’s intertidal zone.
At the same time, a factors-based approach would leave much-needed room to
accommodate emerging (and heretofore unimaginable) public and private uses of
the intertidal zone.
C. Interim Measures for Practitioners
As a legal construct, a dockominium situated on Maine’s coastal waters must
grant private entities an exclusive property interest to a three-dimensional space in,
on, and above the water’s surface, without infringing upon the public trust rights
which burden that same space and without infringing upon the wharf-out rights
which burden adjoining spaces. In light of the existing judicial and administrative
uncertainty with respect to Maine’s public and private intertidal rights, attorneys
representing prospective purchasers and developers of dockominiums and similar
emerging water-based uses that implicate the intertidal zone may wish to take a few
simple, precautionary steps to protect their clients’ interests.
First, attorneys should assess whether the emerging development proposal
might fall within the ambit of the Wharves and Weirs Act. If so, issues concerning
the impact of the proposal on public trust rights, while not entirely eliminated, are
significantly narrowed.143
Second, attorneys should recognize—in option
agreements, deeds, and other real estate instruments—that the intertidal zone in
Maine is burdened by a limited public easement, which, at the very least,
encompasses the public’s right to fishing, fowling, and navigation, “generously
interpreted,” and uses reasonably incidental or related thereto.144 This recognition
is particularly relevant if the emerging development proposal will clearly and
directly infringe on the public trust by permanently excluding the public from the
three-dimensional space which it occupies. Finally, notwithstanding the broad
UCIOA definition for common interest communities, developers of dockominiums
or similar facilities in Maine would be well advised to avoid unintentionally
representing to future slip owners that they will hold an exclusive property interest
in the affected water.

143. The issues are not entirely eliminated, however, because an owner’s right to wharf out is still
subject to reasonable regulation to protect public trust rights. See supra note 77.
144. See Bell II, supra note 71, at 173.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Law Court will soon be presented with another opportunity to reconsider
the scope of the public trust in Maine’s intertidal zone. A property dispute case,
Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport—referred to colloquially as the Goose Rocks
Beach case—is presently before the Superior Court (York County, Brennan, J.).145
Although the case varies somewhat in its facts from both the Moody Beach cases
and from McGarvey, the underlying concern is the same: The upland property
owners have filed a quiet title action and seek a declaratory judgment that they hold
fee title to the intertidal zone, and that the public’s interest does not include a right
to use the zone for general recreational purposes.146
Among other grievances, the owners claim that members of the public have
unlawfully used the intertidal zone for sunbathing, setting bonfires, picnicking, and
storing boats on the beach.147 The Town of Kennebunkport148 counterclaimed that
it holds fee simple title to the property, and that it acquired easement rights to the
property by prescription and custom.149 In addition, the State of Maine, having
been granted intervenor status, sought to have the scope of the public trust doctrine
clarified in light of McGarvey.150
After an extensive trial, the Superior Court issued a partial judgment favoring
the Town, stating that “the public has the right to engage in, or cross over in order
to engage in ‘ocean-based activities’ which can be categorized as fishing, fowling
or navigating in the intertidal zone.”151 The court reiterated the two McGarvey
analyses and concluded, without exposition, that the public’s right “includes the
right to cross the intertidal zone for such ocean-based, waterborne activities as jetskiing; water skiing, knee-boarding or tubing; surfing; windsurfing; boogie
boarding; rafting; tubing; paddleboarding; and snorkeling,” but not “swimming,
bathing or wading; walking; picnicking or playing games in the intertidal zone.”152
The Superior Court ruling is sure to be appealed,153 and the Law Court should
be poised to present a single, coherent theory regarding the scope of the public trust
in Maine’s intertidal zone. Of course, the court could also continue its practice of
resolving public trust conflicts in a case-by-case manner. The implications of the
judicial status quo, however, are solemn. Clearly, judicial doctrine has a direct
effect on the specific water rights controversies that come before Maine’s courts,
145. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Quiet Title, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport,
YORSC-RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Oct. 23, 2009).
146. Id. ¶¶ 46-49.
147. Id. ¶ 40.
148. The original named defendants were the Town of Kennebunkport and all persons, known and
unknown, who claim the right to use or title in the property other than persons claiming ownership or
easement under a recorded instrument. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
149. See Answer, Defenses & Counterclaims of Town of Kennebunkport, Almeder v. Town of
Kennebunkport, RE-09-111 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Nov. 19, 2009).
150. See Partial Judgment, Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, RE-09-111, at 1-2 (Me. Super. Ct.,
Yor. Cty., Oct. 16, 2012) (Brennan, J.).
151. Id. at 20-21.
152. Id. at 21 (internal quotations omitted).
153. See Tom Porter, Judge Sides with Town in Kennebunkport Beach Dispute, THE MAINE PUBLIC
BROADCASTING NETWORK (Oct. 18, 2012) (reporting that plaintiffs will appeal to the Law Court),
http://www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3478/ItemId/24261/Default.aspx.
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and little has been done to date to stem the tide of this type of litigation.154 But the
modern judicial approach to resolving intertidal rights conflicts also hinders
federal, state, and municipal governments from resolving the discord permeating
Maine’s regulatory review of emerging water uses. Absent better guidance from
the Law Court regarding the scope of the public’s rights in the intertidal zones,
regulators will continue to struggle with—and likely altogether avoid—evaluating
the impacts of emerging water use proposals on the public trust. Consequently, the
public’s interest in the intertidal zone might well continue to erode through
piecemeal privatization. The Law Court’s chosen method for deciding these types
of cases will thus either signal the continuation of a case-by-case approach to
addressing use conflicts in Maine’s intertidal zone with its attendant judicial and
regulatory consequences, or represent a seminal step toward a comprehensive and
predictable framework for intertidal rights among public and private entities.

154. Goose Rocks Beach is not the only case in point. See, e.g., Susan Morse, Cliff Walk Backers
Eye Goose Rocks Ruling, SEACOASTONLINE (Nov. 18, 2012, 2:00 AM) (reporting that the Town of
York, Maine, may seek a declaratory judgment as to the ownership of Cliff Walk, an historic stretch of
oceanfront property in southern Maine), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20121125-NEWS211250344.

